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A Field Study of Chinese Migrant Workers' Attitudes toward Risks, Strategic 
Uncertainty, and Competitiveness 
Li Hao, Daniel Houser, Lei Mao, Marie Claire Villeval1 
May 25, 2014 
 
 
Abstract: Using a field experiment in China, we study whether migration status is 
correlated with attitudes toward risk, ambiguity, and competitiveness. Our subjects 
include migrants and non-migrants.  We find that, migrants exhibit no differences from 
non-migrants in risk and ambiguity preferences elicited using pairs of lotteries; 
however, migrants are significantly more likely to enter competition in the presence of 
strategic uncertainty when they expect competitive entries from others.  Our results 
suggest that migration may be driven more by a stronger belief in one’s ability to 
succeed in an uncertain and competitive environment than by risk attitudes under state 
uncertainty.  
 
Key words: Migration, risk preferences, strategic uncertainty, ambiguity, field 
experiment 
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1. Introduction 
Migration plays a critical role in efficiently re-allocating labor to the place where it is 
valued the most; migration is the “grease for the wheel of the labor market” (Borjas, 
2001).  Therefore, it is important to understand migration decisions: what types of 
people choose to migrate?  Are there common characteristics among migrants?  The 
past few decades have witnessed a burgeoning interest in understanding the individual 
determinants of migration decisions, including expected income differences (Harris 
and Todaro, 1970; Brucker and Jahn, 2011); rank in the local income distribution 
(Stark and Taylor, 1991); age and education (Sjaastad, 1962; Schwartz, 1976; 
Chiswick, 1986; Malamud and Wozniak, 2012); family and personal networks (Boyd, 
1989; Pedersen et al., 2008; Munshi, 2003); concentration of peers in the area of 
destination (Mora and Taylor, 2005); asymmetric information on skills (Katz and 
Stark, 1987; Chen, 2005) .  
This paper focuses on the relationship between individuals’ risk preferences and 
their migration status. The decision to relocate to a new environment naturally involves 
uncertainty, e.g., regarding prospects on the labor market, income, housing and 
lifestyles, especially at the beginning of the relocation. Nonetheless, and although early 
theoretical literature has recognized its importance (Stark, 1981; Stark and Levarhi, 
1982; Katz and Stark, 1986), very few empirical studies on migration have measured 
the role of individuals’ risk preferences (Williams and Balaz, 2012). Moreover, the 
empirical evidence in the literature has largely relied on census or survey data with 
self-reported risk preferences that were not elicited in an incentive compatible way 
(David, 1974; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Guiso and Paiella, 2006; Gibson and 
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McKenzie, 2009; Jaeger et al. 2010; Czaika, 2012). For example, Jaeger et al. (2010) 
used survey data from Germany2 to provide evidence that migration propensity is 
positively associated with willingness to take risks. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to use an incentivized field experiment to measure risk preferences directly 
and investigate the relationship between risk preferences and migration propensity.3   
We conducted our experiment in China, where the current rural-urban labor 
migration flows are the largest in the history of humanity (Meng et al., 2010).  China’s 
transition to a market economy first began in its eastern and southern cities in 1978, 
while the suppression of labor mobility also gradually lessened (Lin et al., 1998; Zheng 
et al., 2003).  The abundant labor in rural areas (80% of China’s population in early 
1980’s) began to move to urban areas in search of job opportunities in the rapidly 
growing manufacturing and service sectors.  The scale of migration continued to rise, 
with the number of migrants surpassing 260 million in the year 2012 alone.4  These 
migrant workers are mainly low skilled; they live in employer-provided dormitories, 
and save aggressively to support family members back home.  
This paper reports data from an artefactual field experiment investigating whether 
Chinese migrants exhibit attitudes towards risk and uncertainty that differ from their 
counterparts who did not migrate. Our subjects consist of both migrants and non-
migrants.  Migrants are people who work in a county or a city different from the one 
listed as their domicile residence in the Hukou system (i.e., Household Registration 
                                                
2 Jaeger et al. (2010) used survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) where the risk 
preferences are measured on an eleven-point scale with the question “willingness to take risk in 
general,” with no monetary incentives provided to survey respondents.	  	  
3 More generally, see McKenzie and Yang (2012) on the advantages of using experiments to study 
migration. 
4 According to the 2012 annual report of migrant workers published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20130527_402899251.htm.  
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System).5  Non-migrants, or “stayers,” are those who stay in their hometowns.  We 
elicited each subject’s preferences under risk and ambiguity, as well as willingness to 
compete in an environment with strategic uncertainty.  
We want to clarify important design features in our experiment.   
First, we consider two types of stayers: (i) those in locations where there is little 
out-migration; and (ii) those in locations where there is substantial out-migration.  We 
hypothesize that these two types of stayers could exhibit different preferences. If 
migration is indeed a self-selection process in which risk-seeking individuals migrate 
and risk-averse individuals stay (Umblijs, 2012), then stayers in locations with 
substantial out-migration are the most risk-averse people in the population, and 
migrants are the most risk-seeking.  These stayers are also possibly less competitive as 
large-scale migration can “improve” the situation of stayers through less competition 
for jobs at the local level (Mishra, 2007; McKenzie and Yang, 2012).  On the other 
hand, stayers in locations with little out-migration are still a mixture of risk-seeking 
and risk-averse individuals. This leads to our prediction regarding the risk preferences 
of all three groups: stayers in locations with significant out-migration are more risk-
averse, followed by stayers in locations with little out-migration; finally, migrants are 
the most risk-seeking.6  
Second, we conducted our experiment in both East China and West China, to 
capture the potential differences across regions.  As we discussed earlier, a market 
                                                
5 This is the generally agreed-upon definition, which is used by the Chinese Census Bureau. 
6 The reason that out-migration occurs in some locations, but not in others, is largely due to history-
dependence.  Chinese migrants rely heavily on their social networks to learn about their job prospects in 
new locations (see, e.g., Zhao, 2003; Giles, 2006; Chen et al., 2010). As long as the first group of people 
migrated, people who stayed have better information about migration, which leads to decreased 
uncertainty. As a result, more migration occurs.   
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economy was first introduced in East China, and then gradually extended to West 
China (Lin et al., 1998; Zheng et al., 2003).  Hence, East Chinese are more 
experienced with the market economy, and thus more accustomed to wage and price 
differences and volatilities.  Therefore, we predict that East Chinese are no more risk-
averse than West Chinese and this may influence the propensity to migrate.  
Third, we distinguish between two different sources of uncertainty: state 
uncertainty and strategic uncertainty. State uncertainty refers to unknown outcomes, 
with or without information regarding the probability distributions (Ellsberg, 1961; 
Fox and Tversky, 1995). Strategic uncertainty, on the other hand, is caused by the 
purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation 
(Brandenburger, 1996).  Migration exposes individuals to competition from other 
migrants and local residents, which involves the strategic element by other decision-
makers.7  In our experiment, we use both incentivized lottery choices to elicit risk and 
ambiguity preferences and a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) to elicit willingness to compete, i.e., preference under strategic uncertainty with 
risk of losses.   
Finally, we also included in our experiment a measure for inequality aversion, as 
income inequality could generate feelings of being relatively deprived or relatively 
satisfied, both of which may influence individuals’ migration decisions (Stark and 
Bloom, 1985). However, the results are insignificant and so we comment only briefly 
on this aspect. 
                                                
7 This is even more the case when countries use visa lotteries to select among applicants (like the U.S. 
Green Card Lottery) (see examples in McKenzie and Yang, 2012). 
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Our main findings are that, comparing to stayers, migrants predict significantly 
higher number of entries from other players, and are also more likely to enter 
competition despite expecting competitive entries from others. Nonetheless, these 
populations do not demonstrate differences in risk or ambiguity attitudes under state 
uncertainty. 
Our contributions are twofold. First, we report the first incentivized field 
experiment investigating the relationship between risk preferences and migration 
propensities.  Second, we are the first to study the impact of different sources of risk 
and uncertainty, namely, state risk and uncertainty resolved by die rolls and strategic 
uncertainty due to other people’s beliefs and actions.  This is important in that the 
commonly-used incentivized lottery-type elicitation is often found to have quite weak 
predictive power (Dohmen et al., 2005; 2011).  It follows that it is important to 
examine alternative approaches.  In this sense, our paper makes a methodological 
contribution by studying the differences between migrants’ and non-migrants’ behavior 
in ecologically valid market entry games. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 reports our results. Section 5 
discusses these results and Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related Literature 
Our paper contributes to two related literatures. The first is the literature on risk 
attitudes as a determinant of migration decisions, and the second is the literature on the 
methodology of eliciting risk attitudes.  
In the theoretical literature on the determinants of migrations, Stark (1981) was 
among the first to recognize risk preferences as a major cause of the migration 
decision. Stark and Levhari (1982) have shown that risk aversion may explain that 
rural families in developing countries may push one member to migrate to the urban 
sector in order to diversity their income portfolio. Katz and Stark (1986) have 
considered intertemporal risk and uncertainty and demonstrated that migrants may 
accept an immediate higher risk against the perspective of a great improvement of their 
future status and a subsequent lower risk. Dustmann (1997) has shown how uncertainty 
affects the length of migrations and the re-migration decision. In contrast to the 
previous studies based on the expected utility theory, Czaika (2012) has modeled the 
migration decision under the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979): 
potential migrants update their expectations about their future prospects when 
deviating from their reference point and migration flows react more to negative than 
equivalent positive economic prospects.  
The empirical literature on risk attitudes and migrations has developed more 
recently. An early exception is Sahota (1968) who evokes the higher dynamism and 
greater tolerance for risk of migrants in Brazil. It is interesting to note that contrary to 
the early theoretical literature, most empirical studies have identified a negative link 
between risk aversion and migration propensity. Heitmueller (2005) found that risk-
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averse individuals have a lower propensity to migrate. In a field experiment conducted 
in Bangladesh, Bryan et al. (2012) found that the migration decision is positively 
influenced by the provision of insurance in addition to a loan. This is an indirect 
measure of the impact of risk attitudes. Direct measures include self-reported risk 
preferences. Many studies have used the data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) to study migration propensities.  In particular, respondents reported their 
“willingness to take risks, in general” on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates 
“unwilling to take risks” and 10 indicates “very willing to take risks.” Using SOEP 
data and defining migrants as individuals who changed region at least once between 
2000 and 2006, Jaeger et al. (2010) provided the first direct evidence that individuals 
who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate. Constant et al. (2011) 
found that second generation migrants are more willing to take risks than natives. 
Finally, Dohmen et al. (2005; 2011)8 considered self-reported willingness to take risks 
in specific domains/contexts, such as car driving, financial matters, sports/leisure, 
career and health. They found that the only risk measure that has predictive power on 
respondents’ decision to move is the global self-assessment of risk. In other words, 
none of the domain-specific risk measurements are significant at explaining migration 
decisions. The result holds for migration from East Germany to West Germany, as well 
as from West to East Germany. Using survey data from three Pacific countries, Gibson 
and McKenzie (2009) also found that migration propensity is positively associated 
with willingness to take risks. 
                                                
8 Dohmen et al. (2005) is the discussion paper version of the published paper Dohmen et al. (2011).  The 
former reports more comprehensive results than the latter.  Hence, some of the results we discuss here 
are only available in Dohmen et al. (2005).  
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In contrast, Conroy (2009) reported opposing results for Mexico: more risk-averse 
women are more likely to migrate from countryside to urban areas than less risk-averse 
women, whereas risk preferences have no predictive power of men’s migration 
decisions. Risk-averse women might use migration as a means to escape from 
environments with higher income variability.  
However, the risk preference measures from survey responses used in these 
studies were not given any incentives for accurate reporting.  In addition to the survey 
data, Dohmen et al. (2005; 2011) also studied the measurement of risk attitudes using 
incentivized lottery-type elicitation commonly used in experimental research (see e.g., 
Holt and Laury, 2002; Andersen et al., 2008).  Their experiment was conducted in 
subjects’ homes, where subjects first completed the SOEP questionnaire, and then 
participated in a paid lottery experiment (similar to our risk elicitation under state 
uncertainty).  The authors found that when predicting risk-taking behavior across 
different domains or contexts (i.e., different sources of uncertainty), global self-
assessment of risks is an overall better predictor than risk attitudes elicited using 
incentivized lotteries.  They concluded that risk attitudes do not hold constant across 
domains. This finding seems to raise questions regarding the validity of the 
conventional practice of using lottery-type risk elicitations to explain behaviors in 
other domains. 
A potential concern with the use of incentivized lottery-type elicitation methods is 
a risk of confusion.  However, Charness and Viceisza (2011) indicate that both 
incentivized lottery-type risk elicitation and non-incentivized willingness-to-take-risk 
scale are at the cost of diminished level of comprehension in the rural developing 
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world.  They reported a low level of comprehension under both elicitation approaches. 
Aware of these difficulties, we did our best to facilitate our subjects’ understanding of 
the instructions. 
We contribute to this literature by using monetary incentives to provide more 
accurate measures not only of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, but also towards 
strategic uncertainty.  
 
3. Experimental Procedures and Design 
3.1. Subjects Recruitment and Experiment Locations 
In this study, migrants are individuals who move from rural to urban areas for 
work opportunities, and non-migrants are those who stay in their hometown in rural 
areas.  Among non-migrants, we differentiate between those who live in areas with 
significant out-migrations versus areas with no out-migration.  Hence, we study three 
types of subjects: 
1. Migrants who work and live in urban locations, 
2. Stayers in rural areas with out-migrations and  
3. Stayers in rural areas without out-migrations.   
Due to the fact that migrants in cities and comparable stayers in rural areas are not 
in the same location, it would have been highly impractical to conduct our experiment 
sessions with mixed types of subjects.  Hence, each location in our experiment 
consisted of a single type.  For each type, we had two locations: one in East China, and 
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one in West China.  Therefore, we had a total of six experiment locations. These 
locations are described in Table 1 and by the map in Figure 1.9  
<Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here> 
At each location, we conducted two sessions, with 12 subjects per session, and 24 
subjects per location.  The same group of three experimenters conducted all 12 
sessions. As shown in Table 1, migrants were recruited in the cities of Beijing (East) 
and Chengdu (West). Stayers in rural areas with out-migration were located near 
Yancheng, Jiangsu (East) and Xianyang, Shaanxi (West). Stayers in rural area with no 
out-migrations were located near Xuzhou, Jiangsu (East) and Jiuquan, Gansu (West).  
We included both an East and a West location for each type of subjects for two 
reasons: First, to control for the gap in income and economic environments between 
East and West China.  The East coast offers a much greater exposure to market-
oriented economic activities as well as higher income than West China.  Second, 
migrating from rural to urban areas within West China has become a new trend, so it is 
important to include migrants in West China in our study.  Historically, the main 
pattern was migrating from rural inland areas to big cities in East and South China, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  In recent years, manufacturers have 
gradually moved their factories from the coast to inland provinces, due to the more 
abundant, hence cheaper, labor.  
Subjects were recruited via flyers in all treatments.  In addition, we used door-to-
door recruiting with stayers in rural areas, and face-to-face recruitment for migrants 
living in cities.  Potential participants were informed that they had the opportunity to 
                                                
9 These locations were chosen for two reasons: First, the local migration flow had to satisfy our 
requirements based on the type of subjects we wanted to recruit.  Second, they were local contacts that 
we could trust. 
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earn cash if they participated in an experiment at the given location and time.  As 
subjects arrived, they first completed a short survey (see Appendix 1) regarding their 
migration experience.  We used the survey answers to determine whether each 
respondent qualified for the experiment.  To qualify in Beijing and Chengdu as a 
migrant, one’s domicile residence (Hukou) could not be part of the city, and the person 
must have resided in the city for at least 6 months.  In the four rural locations, we 
required that participants have no migration experience at all.  
Qualified subjects were invited to stay and participate in the main experiment that 
immediately followed the survey.  Those who did not qualify received compensation 
for showing up and responding to the survey.10  The qualification criterion was not 
made common knowledge.  Subjects did not know any details about the experiment 
until the session started.  No qualified subjects declined the opportunity to participate 
in the experiment; nor did anyone quit in the middle of the experiment.  The two 
sessions in each location were conducted immediately back-to-back to minimize 
communication among subjects about the experiment.  A typical session lasted about 
90 minutes. Mean earnings for subjects were 29.71 Yuan (about $4.90) (Standard 
Deviation= 6.82).  
3.2. Experimental Design 
The goal of our experimental design is to investigate whether migrants and stayers 
exhibit different preferences under state uncertainty and strategic uncertainty.  The 
traditional preference elicitation approach only focuses on state uncertainty resolved 
                                                
10 Disqualified survey respondents received gift bags that were equivalent to 8 Yuan.  The gifts included 
everyday household items such as toothpaste, laundry detergent, etc.  These seemed to be preferred over	  
the	  small amount of cash.  This does not interfere with the fact that subjects who participated in our 
main experiment received cash payment. 
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via randomization devices.  Here, we broaden the traditional approach by eliciting 
attitudes towards risk and uncertainty under state uncertainty, as well as willingness to 
compete in an environment with strategic uncertainty.  The strategic element is 
especially important for migration decisions, because other job seekers’ decisions 
immediately affect the prospect of getting a job in a new location.  
Our main experiment includes three components.  Part I elicits risk and ambiguity 
preferences under state uncertainty.  Part II elicits attitudes towards inequality.  Part III 
elicits preferences of competitiveness under strategic uncertainty, using a variant of the 
market entry game in Camerer and Lovallo (1999). 
At the beginning of each part, subjects were given very detailed instructions (see 
Appendix 2).  They were also required to complete comprehension tests.  They 
proceeded in the experiment only after demonstrating that they understood the 
environment. All decisions were made on paper. 
Part I: Risk Attitudes under State Uncertainty 
To elicit risk and ambiguity, we used a multiple price list approach following a 
procedure similar to that of Fox and Tversky (1995).  Each subject was presented with 
a set of choices between two options, A and B, as shown in Table 2.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
For risk elicitation, there were a total of 10 decisions, one in each row, as shown in 
the first 10 rows in Table 2.  For example, in the first row, Option A offered a certain 
payoff of 1 Yuan, while Option B was a lottery that paid 10 Yuan with 50% chance 
and 0 otherwise.  To facilitate comprehension, we illustrated Option B using an urn 
with 10 balls, 5 black and 5 white.  Subjects were told that if a black ball was drawn 
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they would receive 10 Yuan, and if a white ball was drawn they would receive nothing.  
As the subject moved down the list of 10 decisions, the lottery in Option B remained 
the same, while the certain payoff in Option A increased by 1 Yuan each row (ending 
at 10 Yuan).  
To elicit preferences under ambiguity, we followed the same procedure with the 
exception that the composition of the urn (i.e., the probability of winning 10 Yuan in 
Option B) was unknown to subjects.  
After each subject submitted all 20 decisions in Table 2, only one out of the 20 
decisions was randomly selected for payment.   For this payment-binding decision, if 
Option A was chosen, the subject received the corresponding cash amount.  If Option 
B was chosen, the subject drew a ball from the corresponding urn and was paid 
according to its color.  Decisions were made at the beginning of the sessions but the 
random draws and payment were made only at the end of the session to avoid 
contamination of decisions across games. 
Part II: Preference towards Inequality 
To elicit advantageous inequality aversion, we used a procedure inspired by the 
Modified Dictator Game of Blanco et al. (2011).11  In this part, all the subjects made 
decisions in the role of a dictator, under the veil of ignorance.  Each subject chose 
between two different allocations of income between himself and another player, 
Option A or Option B, as illustrated in Table 3.  For example, in the first row, Option 
A offered equal earnings of 1 Yuan to both players, while Option B offered the first 
player an earning of 8 Yuan, and the second player 2 Yuan.  As the subject moved 
                                                
11 We did not elicit disadvantageous inequality aversion because the opportunity to migrate should 
increase the income gap between migrants and stayers at the benefit of the former, not the latter. 
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down the rows, the unequal earnings in Option B remained exactly the same, while the 
equal earnings in Option A increased 1 Yuan per row per player.  The first 8 rows are 
in the gain domain, while the last 8 rows are in the loss domain.  
Earnings were calculated as follows.  After all 16 decisions were submitted, only 
one decision was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were randomly matched in 
pairs, and assigned the role of either Player 1 or Player 2.  For each pair, Player 1’s 
choice for this decision was chosen to determine both Player 1 and Player 2’s earnings.  
Subjects did not know whether they were Player 1 or Player 2 before the end of the 
session. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Part III: Competitiveness: Preference under Strategic Uncertainty  
To investigate preferences under strategic uncertainty, we employed a variant of 
Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) market entry game.  In this game, subjects decided 
whether to enter a market with limited capacity or stay out.  If the subject stayed out, 
she neither gained nor lost.  If she entered, she would either gain or lose, depending on 
the total number of entrants and her rank among them.  In our experiment, the ranks of 
entrants were determined by a random number generator.  All 12 subjects in a session 
made their entry decisions simultaneously, so subjects had to take into account how 
many of their fellow participants they thought would enter the market.  The fact that 
other people’s decisions could affect one’s earnings was the strategic uncertainty. 
Before each subject made her entry decision for a given market capacity in a 
round, they also had to predict how many of the 11 other participants would enter the 
market in this round.  These beliefs indicate whether individuals adjust their behavior 
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to their perception of other players’ competitiveness.  They were incentivized with a 
simple rule such that the subject earned 2 Yuan if her prediction equaled the actual 
number of entrants for that round.  This was in addition to their earnings from the 
game.   
There were a total of 12 rounds of market entry game; payoffs are illustrated in 
Table 4.  For example, in the first round (the first column in Table 4), the total number 
of prizes was 4, and the top 4 entrants earned 9 Yuan each.  Any entrant ranked 5th 
place or lower lost 6 Yuan each.  This is in contrast to earning zero if they chose to 
stay out.  If the number of entrants was smaller than the number of prizes, then every 
entrant won a prize.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
The number of prizes and payoffs at each rank varied from round to round.  In the 
first 8 rounds, top ranks earned positive amounts that were either the same for all or 
decreasing with ranks.  While the number of the prizes and the amounts changed, the 
sum of all prizes was always 36 Yuan.  Next, the 9th (10th) round offered prizes of 6 
(12) Yuan to top ranks, and losses of 6 Yuan to bottom ranks, but the total number of 
prizes was unknown to subjects.  Hence, the degrees of ambiguity in rounds 9 and 10 
were higher than in the first eight rounds.  Up until round 10, staying out always 
yielded an earning of zero.12. 
To help make the game easier to understand, we framed the market as a fishing 
pond, and the total number of prizes was referred to as pond capacity.  Subjects did not 
                                                
12 Rounds 11 and 12 explored the domain of negative earnings to capture attitudes towards losses in the 
presence of strategic uncertainty.  In these rounds, staying out generated a loss of 4 Yuan, while entering 
and ranking among the top ranks resulted in a loss of less than 4 Yuan.  Entering and ranking near the 
bottom resulted in a loss of 6 Yuan.  We do not report the results on the last rounds in this paper. 
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receive any feedback until all 12 rounds were finished, and they were clearly informed 
that only one out of all 12 rounds would be randomly selected for payment at the end 
of the session. 
 
4. Results 
We first present key demographic characteristics.  We then show that migrants and 
stayers do not exhibit any difference regarding their preferences under state 
uncertainty.  Finally, we investigate their preference under strategy uncertainty using 
the market entry game.  Our main results are that: comparing to stayers in locations 
with out-migration, (i) migrants predict significantly higher number of entries from 
other players, and are more willing to enter competition despite expecting competitive 
entries from others; (ii) stayers in locations with no out-migration also predict higher 
number of entries, and are more likely to enter competition despite expecting 
competitive entries from others.  
4.1. Demographic Statistics 
Table 5 summarizes some key demographics variables of the three groups of 
subjects in our experiment. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
First, regarding age, migrants were youngest; stayers with no out-migration were 
older; and stayers with out-migration were the oldest.  This is consistent with the 
observation that younger people migrate, and older people stay in their hometowns.  
Locations with no out-migration have more balanced age groups, so the average is in 
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between.  Income is ordered in exactly the opposite direction of subjects’ ages, due to 
the fact that people migrate for better pay in urban areas.  In all three groups, we had 
more men than women.  Subjects, on average, were either middle school graduates or 
high school dropouts who spent 9 to 10 years in school.  Naturally, the number of 
elderly dependents (as grown children in China are expected to support their elderly 
parents and grandparents) is negatively correlated with subjects’ age; it is also 
positively correlated with their income.  Migrants reportedly support more elders on 
average than stayers, suggesting that greater family responsibility is a major motivation 
for young people to migrate for job opportunities. 
 
4.2. Preference regarding Risks, Ambiguity, and Inequality 
In this subsection, we report data on preferences towards risks, ambiguity, and 
inequality from Parts I and II of the experiment.  
In Part I, a rational decision maker should switch at most once from the lottery 
(Option B) to the certain payoff (Option A) in both the risky and the ambiguous 
lotteries. The switch points in the two sets of decisions are informative about the 
individual’s attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, respectively.  We measure 
preferences using the number of risky or ambiguous Option B chosen by the subject.13  
                                                
13 Precisely, we take the midpoint of the decision numbers before and after the switch. For example, if a 
participant switches over to Option A from Option B at Decision #5, then we record 4.5 as his risk 
preference.  For people who switch back and forth, we count the frequency of the risky option (Option 
B) chosen, and add 0.5 for the precision adjustment. In fact, 35, 30, 40 and 46 subjects switched more 
than once in the risk game, the ambiguity game, in the gain domain of the inequality game and in the 
loss domain of the inequality game, respectively. These values are high, but the frequency of multiple 
switching does not differ significantly between our groups of subjects (see Table A1 in Appendix 3), and 
frequent multiple switching is typical of experiments conducted in the field (see notably Charness and 
Viceisza, 2011).   
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Option B has an expected payoff of 5 Yuan.  Subjects will switch to the “safe” Option 
A when it is attractive enough.  Switching at decision 5 or 6 indicates neutrality; 
switching earlier (later, respectively) indicates risk aversion (risk loving, respectively).  
Hence, the number of Option B’s indicates a subject’s willingness to take risk; the 
greater this number, the more willing the subject is to take risk. 
In Part II, a rational decision maker should also switch at most once from the 
asymmetric (Option B) to the symmetric allocation (Option A) in the gain domain, and 
in the other opposite direction in the loss domain.  Preferences towards inequality are 
measured by the number of unequal Option B chosen by the subject.  In the gain 
domain, this indicates the subject’s willingness to accept inequality in earnings.  In the 
loss domain, this suggests the willingness to take unequal losses. In both domains, the 
later the switch, the less inequality averse is the subject. 
Figure 2 summarizes the mean and standard errors of the preferences by subject 
types. The first set of three bars indicates their risk preferences; the next sets of bars 
are for the attitudes towards ambiguity and towards inequality in the gain and the loss 
domains.  None of the pair-wised comparisons between subject types is significant 
(mean comparison tests, p>0.10) (see Table A2 in Appendix 3).  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
We formally show our first result using regression analysis with control variables 
shown in Table 6.  
Result 1. (Preference under State Uncertainty).  Under state uncertainty, migrants and 
stayers do not exhibit any difference in preferences over risk and ambiguity. 
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Support for Result 1. Table 6 reports multivariate regressions with robust standard 
errors for four dependent variables: subjects’ preferences for risk, ambiguity, 
inequality in the gain domain, and inequality in the loss domain. These preferences are 
measured as the number of risky (or unequal) options subjects chose. We included a 
dummy variable Multi-switcher that takes value “one” if the subject switched between 
risky and safe options (or equal and unequal) more than once, and is zero otherwise. 
There are two regressions for each preference, where we either do or do not include the 
variable East, a dummy variable that takes value “one” if the subject was located on 
the East coast, and is zero otherwise.  Our main interests are the coefficients of 
“Migrant” and “Stayer with no out-migration”, which indicate whether these two 
groups behave different from the omitted category “Stayer with out-migration.” Other 
control variables are gender, age and income.   
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Regarding preferences towards risk and ambiguity, two results are robust.  First, 
migrants do not differ from stayers with out-migration; second, stayers with no out-
migration do not differ from stayers with out-migration.  This result is in contrast with 
the conventional wisdom that migrants tend to be more willing to take risks.  
Regressions of inequality in both gain and loss domains are hardly significant at 
the 5% level, with F-statistics smaller than 2.50 in all cases.  Because conclusions can 
be misleading if one makes inferences based on insignificant models, the rest of this 
subsection focuses on preferences regarding risks and ambiguity only. 
The control variables, such as gender and age, are significant in the direction we 
expected (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Mather et al., 2012).  Males are significantly 
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more risk/ambiguity-seeking than females, while younger individuals are more 
risk/ambiguity-seeking than older ones, controlling for migration status.  The variable 
East is worth noting here.  In specifications (2) and (4), the regressions of Risk and 
Ambiguity, adding East significantly improved the regression’s goodness-of-fit, as 
evidenced by the fact the adjusted R2 more than doubled in both cases.   
 
4.3. Preference regarding Competition under Strategic Uncertainty 
We report in this subsection results from the first eight rounds of the market entry 
game where all payoffs are positive and the number of prizes is known to subjects.14  
In these rounds, there are several asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategy, under 
the assumption of risk neutrality.  If rational, c+5 or c+6 decision-makers should enter 
the market.  For c=2 and c=4, the c+6th player should be indifferent because his 
expected payoff from entry is 0.  Above c+6 entrants, entering the market leads to 
negative expected payoffs.  For c=6 and c=9, all the players should enter the market 
(only the 12th subject should be indifferent when c=6).  A higher expected number of 
entrants above the market capacity should reduce the entry of risk-neutral individuals 
(except when c>4).   Naturally, risk and ambiguity aversion should lead players to be 
indifferent between entering and staying out at lower ranks above the capacity.  
Table 7 reports marginal effects of six probit regressions	  with robust standard 
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.15  First, we investigate whether 
the decision to enter competition is associated with one’s migration status. In models 
                                                
14 Regressions of the last four rounds in the market entry game are not significant; therefore, we do not 
report those results. 
15   Our results remain unchanged using linear probability models clustered at the individual level. 
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(1) and (2), the dependent variable “entry” is 1 if the subject entered the competition, 0 
otherwise.  In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable “competitiveness” is 1 if the 
subject entered the competition after having predicted that the number of entrants was 
greater than the number of prizes, and 0 otherwise. Models (2) and (4) include only the 
explanatory variables: migration status (stayers with out-migration are not included 
and hence the base group for comparison). Models (1) and (3) include control variables 
such as male, age, income, east, risk preferences (measured by the switching point 
from the risky to the safe option), and a dummy variable “risk multi-switcher” 
indicating that the subject did multi-switch at least in the risk preference elicitation. 
This leads to Result 2. 
Result 2a. (Competitiveness). Among those who believe that there are more entrants 
than prizes, migrants are significantly more likely to enter the market competition than 
stayers with out-migration.  
Result 2b. (Competitiveness). Among those who believe that there are more entrants 
than prizes, stayers with no out-migration are significantly more likely to enter the 
market competition than stayers with out-migration. 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Support for Result 2. Model (2) shows that migrants are 17% significantly more 
likely to enter the market than stayers with out-migration.  This effect is not significant 
(p-value=0.11) in model (1) where we include the set of control variables in model. 
However,, models (3) and (4) show that, robust to including/excluding control 
variables, migrants who have predicted greater entries than number of prizes are 18% 
significantly more likely to enter the competition. These results suggest that migrants 
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are more competitive and have greater confidence in their ability to win.  Similarly, 
compared to stayers with out-migration stayers with no out-migration are 13% more 
likely to enter the competition and 13% more likely to compete when they predict a 
high level of competition to win a prize.   
Next, we analyze whether migrants and stayers differ in their predicted 
competitiveness of others.  The dependent variable in models (5) and (6) is “predicted 
market competitiveness”, which is 1 if the subject’s predicted number of entrants is 
greater than the number of prizes for the round, and is 0 otherwise.  Our next set results 
follows. 
Result 3a. (Prediction of Market Competition).  Migrants are significantly more likely 
to predict a number of entries in excess of the market capacity than stayers with out-
migration.  
Result 3b. (Prediction of Market Competition).  Stayers with no out-migration are 
significantly more likely to predict a number of entries in excess of the market capacity 
than stayers with out-migration.  
Support for Result 3. Model (5) shows that, keeping all control variables at their 
median values, migrants are 20% more likely to predict market entries of others is in 
excess of the market capacity than stayers with out-migration.  Similarly, stayers with 
no out-migration are 19% more likely to predict excess entries than stayers with out-
migration.  We also observe that those who are more risk-loving under state 
uncertainty are marginally more likely to expect market competitiveness.   
Results (2) and (3) suggest that migrants are not only more competitive; they also 
expect competitiveness from others.  Indeed, they are both more likely to predict the 
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competitiveness of others and more likely to enter the competition when they predict a 
tough competition.16  
 
5. Discussion 
We have investigated preferences between three groups of subjects: migrants, 
stayers with and without out-migration, considering two sources of uncertainty: state 
and strategic uncertainty.  Two key issues are raised by our investigation.  
Two types of stayers. – We use stayers at locations with out-migration as the base 
group to compare with the other two groups.  These stayers are the people who choose 
not to migrate despite having easier access to information regarding migration (from 
their migrating neighbors) than stayers in locations where only very few people have 
migrated. Our results confirm the hypothesis that stayers with out-migration are less 
willing to enter a competition with strategic uncertainty than stayers without out-
migration.  In contrast, no difference has been found across groups in attitudes towards 
risk and ambiguity under state uncertainty.   
East China vs. West China. – An interesting and robust finding in our data is that 
people who reside in East China are significantly more willing to take risks under state 
uncertainty and they are less inequality averse in the gain domain, regardless of 
whether they are migrants or local residents.  As shown in Tables 6 and 7, the 
goodness-of-fit of all regression models improves dramatically after including the 
                                                
16 For a robustness check, we re-do all the regressions from Results 2 and 3, but with a subset of data 
where pond capacity is either 2 or 4, which means the number of entrants at equilibrium is smaller than 
12. Summarizing Table A3 in Appendix, most results remain qualitatively the same, although stayers 
with no out-migration no longer differ from the other stayers. 
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control variable East, indicating the variable’s significance in explaining the data.  
When the economic reform started three decades ago, it was focused in East and South 
coasts of China (mainly Shanghai and Shengzhen), while the reform occurred at a 
much slower pace in West China. Therefore, people in East China have been exposed 
to market economy longer, and more comprehensively.  We speculate that people in 
East China are more used to higher variance in opportunities and wealth, and migrants 
who moved from inland to East China are self-selected to be similar, or have adapted 
to the norms.  This result is in line with prior findings that economic regime could 
reshape individuals’ preferences (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-
Schundeln, 2007; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011).  Finally, it is important to note that this 
East-West difference does not change our main findings regarding migrants vs. non-
migrants differences as regards strategic uncertainty, as shown in Table 7. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We conducted the first incentivized field experiment to study whether migration 
decisions could be explained by risk attitudes, competitiveness, or both. We find that 
migrants are significantly more willing than non-migrants to enter a competition with 
strategic uncertainty; in contrast, people from different groups demonstrate identical 
attitudes towards risk and ambiguity under state uncertainty.17   
Our contributions are twofold. First, our results contribute to the debate on the 
relationship between risk preferences and migration propensity.  As our results show, 
                                                
17 We acknowledge that our conclusions are drawn based earnings about half a day to a full day’s wage. 
These are not life-changing stakes, but decent amount of incentives that give us insights about subjects’ 
preferences. 
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the answer is not straightforward, and depends on how the uncertainty is generated: 
does it involve other people’s decisions?  Competing with other participants seems to 
resonate with migrants well, as they take significantly more risk in this environment 
than non-migrants when they expect a tough competition, whereas no behavioral 
difference is found between the two groups when the risks are generated via die rolls.  
Intuitively, this finding is consistent with the fact that migrants move to urban 
locations to enter the competition in the labor market.  
Second, our results suggest that the conventional methodology of eliciting risk 
preferences using lists of lotteries is not one-size-fits-all.  As a complementary tool, the 
market entry game used in this paper seems quite suitable when the outcome variables 
of interest involve human interactions, and especially competition.  Our paper takes a 
first step towards enriching the toolbox of incentivized preference elicitation methods 
in a way that might be useful for better understanding migration decisions.  
With a quarter billion Chinese people migrating from rural to urban areas in the 
year 2013 alone, there is clearly significant policy importance tied to understanding 
determinants of migration decisions.  Large-scale migration not only provides rich 
labor resources to businesses in more developed regions, but also ameliorates 
unemployment and enables rural populations to escape poverty.  At the same time, the 
influx of large migrant populations into cities raises widespread concerns regarding the 
adequacy of health care, education and housing. An improved understanding of 
migration decisions, and the preferences of migrants, is a step towards designing 
policies that enable communities to realize the substantial benefits of migration at 
minimum social cost.   
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Table 1. Number of Sessions and Subjects at Each Location 
Subjects type  Location West China  
Location 
East China  
# of 
sessions 
# of 
subjects 
Migrants  Chengdu  Beijing  4 48 
Stayers with Out-migration  Xianyang  Yancheng  4 48 
Stayers with No Out-migration  Jiuquan  Xuzhou  4 48 
Total number of subjects  72  72   144 
 
 
Table 2: Risk and Ambiguity Elicitation 
Risk: 
Option A 
Certain payoff in Yuan 
Option B  
10 balls in an urn, 5 blue and 5 yellow; 
Blue pays 10 Yuan, Yellow pays 0. 
Decision 1: 1 
(10 Yuan, 50%; 0, 50%) 
 
Decision 2: 2 
Decision 3: 3 
Decision 4: 4 
Decision 5: 5 
Decision 6: 6 
Decision 7: 7 
Decision 8: 8 
Decision 9: 9 
Decision 10: 10 
Ambiguity:  
10 balls in an urn, unknown blue or yellow; 
Blue pays 10 Yuan, Yellow pays 0. 
Decision 11: 1 
10 Yuan or 0; unknown probability 
Decision 12: 2 
Decision 13: 3 
Decision 14: 4 
Decision 15: 5 
Decision 16: 6 
Decision 17: 7 
Decision 18: 8 
Decision 19: 9 
Decision 20: 10 
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Table 3: Inequality Elicitation 
 Option A Equal earnings for Players X and Y 
Option B 
Unequal earnings for Players X and Y 
Gain Domain  
Decision 1: X earns 1; Y earns 1 
X earns 8; Y earns 2 
Decision 2: X earns 2; Y earns 2 
Decision 3: X earns 3; Y earns 3 
Decision 4: X earns 4; Y earns 4 
Decision 5: X earns 5; Y earns 5 
Decision 6: X earns 6; Y earns 6 
Decision 7: X earns 7; Y earns 7 
Decision 8: X earns 8; Y earns 8 
Loss Domain  
Decision 1: X loses 1; Y loses 1 
X loses 8; Y loses 2 
Decision 2: X loses 2; Y loses 2 
Decision 3: X loses 3; Y loses 3 
Decision 4: X loses 4; Y loses 4 
Decision 5: X loses 5; Y loses 5 
Decision 6: X loses 6; Y loses 6 
Decision 7: X loses 7; Y loses 7 
Decision 8: X loses 8; Y loses 8 
 
 
Table 4: Payoffs in Market Entry Game 
 Gain domain   Ambiguity  Loss domain 
Rank R.1 c=4 
R.2 
c=9 
R.3 
c=2 
R.4 
c=9 
R.5 
c=2 
R.6 
c=6 
R.7 
c=6 
R.8 
c=4 
 R.9 
c=? 
R.10 
c=? 
 R.11 
- 
R.12 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
+9 
+9 
+9 
+9 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
+8 
+7 
+6 
+5 
+4 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+1 
-6 
-6 
-6 
+18 
+18 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
-6 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
-6 
-6 
-6 
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Table 5: Demographic Statistics  
Status 
 
Migrants  
 
Stayers with no out-
migration  
Stayers with out-
migration  
Age 32.2 (1.73) 
37.3 
(1.62) 
45.12 
(2.26) 
Income/day (Yuan) 62.4 (10.3) 
40.4 
(3.80) 
28.4 
(3.80) 
Male 0.60 (0.07) 
0.51 
(0.07) 
0.75 
(.06) 
Education 9.8 (0.31) 
8.5 
(0.31) 
10 
(0.40) 
Elderly dependents 2.27 (0.25) 
2.02 
(0.23) 
1.36 
(0.20) 
Observations 48 48 48 
Notes: Means are reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% significance level; ** 5%, 
and *** 1%. 
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Table 6: Determinants of the Preferences under State Uncertainty 
 Risk Ambiguity Inequality Gain Inequality Loss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Migrant 
-0.895 -0.985 -0.978 -1.074 -1.238** -1.292** 0.070 0.036 
(0.645) (0.616) (0.680) (0.667) (0.508) (0.510) (0.519) (0.524) 
Stayer w. 
no out-
migration 
-0.147 -0.260 -0.025 -0.153 -0.485 -0.553 -0.015 -0.056 
(0.655) (0.632) (0.694) (0.667) (0.499) (0.500) (0.443) (0.448) 
Male 
1.389* 1.323* 1.102** 1.009** 0.569 0.536 0.211 0.189 
(0.471) (0.455) (0.504) (0.483) (0.407) (0.392) (0.405) (0.394) 
Age 
-0.044* -0.050* -0.030* -0.037** -0.027* -0.030* 0.004 0.002 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Income 
0.006* 0.004 0.009* 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Multi-
switcher 
0.654 0.579 0.484 0.509 -0.312 -0.308 -0.053 -0.060 
(0.399) (0.419) (0.392) (0.414) (0.371) (0.377) (0.345) (0.341) 
East 
 1.432*  1.663*  0.839**  0.501 
 (0.434)  (0.454)  (0.384)  (0.348) 
Intercept 
5.856* 5.609* 5.127* 4.818* 6.038* 5.883* 4.358* 4.269* 
(1.013) (1.005) (1.081) (1.100) (0.746) (0.770) (0.745) (0.775) 
R2 0.123 0.194 0.0963 0.187 0.0761 0.111 0.00432 0.0199 
F 4.123 5.779 2.691 5.037 2.015 2.403 0.110 0.347 
Nb of obs. 131 129 131 131 
Notes: OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Regressions 
of “Ambiguity” have two fewer observations due to missing observations in some of the regressors. * is 10% 
significance level; ** is 5%, and *** 1%. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the Probability of Entry, Competitiveness and Predicted 
Competitiveness of Others in the Market Entry Game  
 
 Entry Competitiveness Predicted Competitiveness of 
Others 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Migrant 
0.143 0.168** 0.192** 0.181* 0.199** 0.159** 
(0.089) (0.080) (0.084) (0.066) (0.088) (0.073) 
Stayer w. no 
out-migration 
0.136* 0.132* 0.127* 0.128** 0.188* 0.172** 
(0.079) (0.074) (0.068) (0.062) (0.070) (0.068) 
Male 
0.104  -0.025  -0.041  
(0.077)  (0.062)  (0.071)  
Age 
-0.001  0.001  0.001  
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Income 
0.002  0.000  -0.001  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Risk 
0.006  0.018*  0.030*  
(0.014)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
Risk Multi-
switcher 
-0.118*  -0.145**  -0.070  
(0.065)  (0.066)  (0.064)  
East 
-0.053  -0.039  -0.039  
(0.063)  (0.053)  (0.058)  
Observations 1031 1039 1032 1040 1032 1040 
Clusters 129 130 129 130 129 130 
Pseudo R2 .0433 .0153 .0505 .0257 .0398 .0189 
 
Notes: These regressions only consider decisions and beliefs in the first eight rounds of the fishing game. 
Estimates are from Probit regressions clustered at the individual level, with marginal effects reported 
as point estimates, and fully robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * is 10% significance level; 
** is 5%, and *** 1%. 
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Figure 1. Experiment Locations 
 
 
Figure 2. Preferences for Risk, Ambiguity and Inequality, by Migration Status 
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Online Appendix 1. Survey used to qualify participants. 
 
We thank you for participating in this survey that may allow you to participate in an experiment. This 
experiment is part of an international research program on risk. Not all of you will be able to participate 
in the experiment but you have a great chance to be invited.  
Please take some time to answer the following questions honestly. Your answers will only be used in 
research and will be kept anonymously and confidentially for the sole use of the researchers conducting 
this survey. They will not be communicated to anybody outside the research investigators. None of your 
answers in this survey will be associated with your performance in the following games if you are 
chosen to be a participant in the games. 
 
1. Local Address 
Province          City          District (County)          Street                                                                                                         
Family Address 
Province          City (County)          District (Town)          Street (Village)                                                                                                                                                
2. Family name          Given name                               
3. Cell Phone          Fixed-line Telephone                                         
4. Year of birth                     
5. Gender          (Male/Female) 
6. Attained Highest Education Level           
A. Illiterate 
B. Junior School 
C. Middle School 
D. High School 
E. Vocational Secondary School 
F. Junior College 
G. Bachelor Degree or more (Master Degree, PhD) 
7. Nationality           
8. Marital status          (Married/Single) 
9. How many children do you have?           
10. Do you have close relatives (parents, children, uncles or taunts, nephews or nieces) who left their 
county to work or run business in another county? 
A. Yes              B. No   
If your answer is yes, how many people left their county to work or run business in another county?           
11. Do you personally know neighbors who left this county to work or run business in another county? 
A. Yes              B. No   
12. Have you ever worked or run business in another county? 
A. Yes              B. No 
If your answer is yes, please answer the following questions. 
13. How long in total have you worked or run business in other county in the past 10 years?           
years          months.  
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14. How long have you worked or run business in other county in 2009?       
_______ months (input 0 if you stayed in this county all along the year 2009).                           
15. Where did you work or run business outside this county the last time?  
16. Why did you leave your hometown? 
A. It is difficult to find a job in hometown  
B. To increase the household income  
C. To learn new skills  
D. Parents or friends advised me to work outside  
E. Other reason, please write it down                                                                       
                                                              
Thank you for your answers! 
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Online Appendix 2. Instructions (translated into and from Chinese) 
 
We thank you for participating in this experiment that is part of an international research program on 
risk. During this experiment you can earn a considerable amount of money if you read the instructions 
carefully.  
This experiment consists of 3 parts during which you will make many decisions. During this session, 
your earnings will be calculated in points with the following conversion rate:  
1 point =1 RMB 
The earnings in points you will make during these parts will be determined only at the end of the 
session. At the end of the session, these earnings in points you will make in the various parts will be 
added up, converted into RMB and paid to you in cash and in private. 
All your decisions are anonymous and confidential. Your decisions will be communicated only to the 
researchers involved in this research program. 
Throughout the session, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. Be aware that if 
you communicate with others, you will be excluded from the session and from the payments. 
If at any stage, you have any question, please raise your hand and research assistants will answer your 
questions. 
Part One 
On the attached form, we will present you successively with two urns that contain each ten balls, either 
white or blank. The urn X contains 10 balls: 5 white balls and 5 black balls. The urn Y contains 10 
balls, both white and black balls, but you do not know the proportion of balls of each color.  
For each urn, you must make 10 successive choices between extracting a ball from the urn with 
replacement (there are always 10 balls in the urn) or earning a certain amount of money. If you decide 
to draw a ball from the urn and you extract a black ball, you earn 10 points; if you extract a white 
ball, you earn 0 point. The 10 certain amounts will vary between 1 point and 10 points. Only one of 
these twenty decisions for two urns will matter for determining your earnings in this part, as explained 
below.  
Please indicate on the attached form for each proposed choice if you prefer receiving the certain amount 
or extracting a ball from the urn. 
How do we determine your earnings in this part? 
At the end of the session, you are requested to flip a coin to determine which urn will be actually used to 
determine your earnings (either the urn X or the urn Y). If the side has a tail on it, the urn X (with 5 
black balls and 5 white balls) will be used. If the side has a head on it, the urn Y (with unknown number 
of black and white balls) will be used. 
Next, for this urn, you will randomly draw a number between 1 and 10 to determine which of your 10 
decisions will matter for determining your earnings. 
For this decision, if you have ticked “I choose the certain amount”, you will earn this amount. If you 
have chosen to extract a ball from the urn, you will extract the ball from the selected urn. If you extract a 
black ball, 10 points will be added to your other earnings from the experiment. If you extract a white 
ball, you earn nothing. 
 
Consider a first example. Imagine that decision 4 in the urn X is selected: 
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Decision 
Number 
Option A 
 
Option B 
Urn X 
 
Decision 4 □ I choose to earn the certain 
amount of 4 points 
□ I choose to extract a ball from 
urn X 
 
For this decision, suppose you have chosen option A. You will earn 4 points for sure. 
 
Consider a second example. Imagine that decision 8 in the urn X is selected.  
 
Decision 
Number 
Option A 
 
Option B 
Urn X 
 
Decision 8 □ I choose to earn the certain 
amount of 8 points 
□ I choose to extract a ball from 
urn X 
 
Suppose that for this decision, you chose option B. You will draw one ball from urn X. If the ball color 
indicates black, you earn 10 points. If the ball color indicates white, you earn 0 point. 
Consider a third example. Imagine that the urn Y is selected and decision 6 is selected.  
 
Decision 
Number 
Option A 
 
Option B 
                 Urn Y 
 
Decision 6 □ I choose to earn the certain 
amount of 6 points 
□ I choose to extract a ball from 
urn Y 
 
Suppose that for this decision, you chose option B. You will draw one ball. If the ball color indicates 
black, you earn 10 points. If the ball color indicates white, you earn 0 points. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private.  
 
Part Two 
 
In this part, we form groups of two players, player X and player Y. Your earnings or losses depend on 
your decision or on the decision of another person and on a random draw.  
You will make 16 successive decisions in the role of player X. In each decision, player X must choose a 
payoff distribution between himself and player Y. Player Y can only accept the payoff chosen by player 
X.  
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For each of the 16 decisions, you have to choose privately between option A (left column) or option B 
(right column). Every decision will have an equal chance to be chosen for actual payment at the end of 
the session, so you should make every decision seriously.  
At the end of the session, we will match you with another person in this room. You will never be 
informed on the identity of the other person. Next, we will randomly draw your role and that of the other 
person such that there is one player X and one player Y in each pair. 
Next, you will randomly draw a number between 1 and 16 to determine which of your 16 decisions will 
matter for determining your earnings or loss. 
If you have been assigned the role of player X, you earn or lose the amount you have chosen for yourself 
in that decision. If you are assigned the role of player Y, you earn or lose the amount that player X with 
whom you are paired has chosen for person Y in this decision.  
Consider a first example. Imagine that you have been assigned the role of player Y and that decision 3 
is selected.  
 
Option A 
Player X earns 3 and 
Player Y earns 3 
□ I choose option A 
 
Option B 
Player X earns 8 and 
Player Y earns 2 
□ I choose option B 
 
 
If the player X has chosen option A, he/she earns 3 points and you earn 3 points. If the player X has 
chosen option B, he or she earns 8 points and you earn 2 points. 
 
Consider a second example. Imagine that you have been assigned the role of player X and that decision 
6 is selected.  
 
Option A 
Player X earns 6 and 
Player Y earns 6 
□ I choose option A 
 
Option B 
Player X earns 8 and 
Player Y earns 2 
□ I choose option B 
 
 
If you have chosen option A, you earn 6 points and player Y earns 6 points. If you have chosen option 
B, you earn 8 points and player Y earns 2 points. 
 
Consider a third example. Imagine that you have been assigned the role of player X and that decision 
12 is selected.  
 
Option A 
Player X earns  - 4 and 
Player Y earns  - 4  
□ I choose option A 
 
Option B 
Player X earns  - 2 and 
Player Y earns  - 8 
□ I choose option B 
 
 
If you have chosen option A, you lose 4 points and player Y loses 4 points. If you have chosen option B, 
you lose 2 points and player Y loses 8 points. 
 
Consider a fourth example. Imagine that you have been assigned the role of player Y and that decision 
16 is selected.  
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Option A 
Player X earns - 8 and 
Player Y earns - 8 
□ I choose option A 
 
Option B 
Player X earns - 2 and 
Player Y earns - 8 
□ I choose option B 
 
 
If the player X has chosen option A, he/she loses 8 points and you lose 8 points. If the player X has 
chosen option B, he or she loses 2 points and you lose 8 points. 
 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. Any 
communication between participants is forbidden throughout the experiment. 
 
Part Three 
In this part, there will be 3 sub-parts including totally 12 trials and the three sub-parts will be run one by 
one. Every sub-part involves a series of decisions about whether or not to go fishing. After completion 
of the whole session, one of the 12 trials will be randomly chosen for true payment. 
There are eight trials in the first sub-part. You receive an initial endowment of 6 points in every 
decision. In all of the eight trials in this sub-part, we will announce a number C. C is the capacity of the 
pond, i.e. the number of anglers who can catch fish. For example, if C=3, then the 3 highest-rank 
entrants will be successful (earn points) and lower-ranked entrants will be unsuccessful (lose points). In 
all of the eight decisions, the successful entrants earn some points and the unsuccessful entrants lose 
some points.  
In each decision, your task is you decide simultaneously with other participants if you go fishing in the 
pond. In the eight trials, if you do not go fishing, then you earn nothing and lose nothing. Therefore, if 
you want to guarantee that you will lose nothing, simply do not go fishing. If you go fishing, then your 
payoff in points is determined by the payoff table shown on each form, and by your rank relative to the 
ranks of the other participants who decided to go fishing as you (as explained below).  
In each trial, we will distribute one sheet indicating the capacity of the pond for the current trial and a 
payoff table. First, we ask you to estimate how many of the 11 other participants in this session 
(excluding you) you expect will go fishing in the pond. Next, you will indicate whether you decide to go 
fishing, by checking the appropriate box. 
The following table gives you an example of the payoff table in a trial. 
For example, suppose C (capacity of the pond) =4 and your initial endowment is 6 points: 
 
 
Pond Capacity=4 
Rank Level Payoff  
1 
 
2   
3 
  
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
In the four rows above, 
payoffs are positive; in 
the remaining rows 
below, payoffs are 
always – 6 points. 
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7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
 
Please indicate the number of other participants you believe will choose to enter (a number between 0 
and 11) ________ 
Please indicate your decision: □ I enter  □ I stay out 
Suppose that you have decided to go fishing in the pond. If you are the first highest-ranked among those 
participants who have decided to go fishing in pond, you earn 18 points. You earn 12 points if you are 
ranked second. You earn 4 points if you are ranked third; you earn 2 points if you are ranked fourth. If 
you are ranked fifth or more, you lose 6 points. 
How is your rank determined? 
Your rank is determined as follows. At the end of this session, if this trial is chosen for actual payment, 
we will prepare messages indicating the id number of participants who chose to enter and we will 
randomly assign messages to ranks. If the message indicating your id number is chosen first, you are 
assigned the highest rank; if the message indicating your id number is chosen secondly, you are assigned 
the second highest rank. Like this, you will be assigned the lowest rank if the message indicating your id 
number is chosen lastly. 
How is your payoff determined in this part? 
At the end of the session, we will put 12 messages representing 12 trials in the three sub-parts, numbered 
from 1 to 12, in a bag. We will extract one message from the bag. Its number will indicate the number of 
the trial that will be paid. Because every trial has an equal chance of being chosen for payment, you 
should make every decision seriously.  
In the trial that is chosen for actual payment, we determine your payoff as follows.  
- If your prediction for the number of participants who go fishing in the pond is correct, you earn 
2 points.  
- We will calculate the number of participants who go fishing in the pond in this trial. If you have 
decided to go fishing in the pond, we determine your rank relative to the rank of the other 
participants who have chosen to fish as you. If your rank is less than or equal to the pond 
capacity, C, you earn points accordingly. If your rank level is more than the market capacity, C, 
you will lose points accordingly.  
- Your total payoff is the sum of your initial endowment in this trial + your earnings for your 
correct predictions + the points earned from your fishing decision /or/ - the points lost from 
your fishing decision in this trial.   
 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. Any 
communication between participants is forbidden throughout the experiment. 
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Online Appendix 3. Tables 
Table A1: Proportion of multiple switchers, pairwise comparison tests  
Preferences Migrants vs. Stayers 
with no out-
migration 
Migrants vs. Stayers 
with out-migration 
Stayers with no out- 
migration vs. Stayers 
with out-migration 
Risk 0.816 0.368 0.259 
Ambiguity  0.492 0.826 0.368 
Note: These values are p-values from pairwise proportion tests. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
Table A2: Mean attitudes towards risk, ambiguity and inequality in the domain of gains and 
the domain of losses, pairwise comparison tests 
Preferences Migrants vs. Stayers 
with no out-migration 
Migrants vs. Stayers 
with out-migration 
Stayers with no out- 
migration vs. Stayers 
with out-migration 
Risk 0.647 0.809 0.862 
Ambiguity  0.272 0.541 0.721 
Inequality 
       Gain domain 
 
0.210 
 
0.103 
 
0.640 
       Loss domain 0.834 0.943 0.769 
Note: These values are p-values from pairwise mean-comparison tests. 
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Table A3: Determinants of the Probability of Entry, Competitiveness and Predicted 
Competitiveness of Others in the Market Entry Game under Limited Number of Prizes  
 Entry Competitiveness Predicted Competitiveness of 
Others 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Migrant 
0.149 0.174** 0.177* 0.165** 0.212** 0.158* 
(0.102) (0.088) (0.095) (0.076) (0.100) (0.088) 
Stayer w. no 
out-migration 
0.025 0.024 0.059 0.051 0.174* 0.140* 
(0.094) (0.088) (0.086) (0.076) (0.090) (0.085) 
Male 
0.117  0.029  0.027  
(0.086)  (0.079)  (0.089)  
Age 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.001  
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Income 
0.002  0.000  -0.002  
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
East 
-0.042  -0.068  -0.077  
(0.072)  (0.063)  (0.073)  
Risk 
0.013  0.019  0.034**  
(0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  
Risk Multi-
switcher 
-0.136*  -0.129*  0.013  
(0.080)  (0.077)  (0.083)  
Observations 516 520 516 520 516 520 
Clusters 129 130 129 130 129 130 
Pseudo R2 .0635 .0178 .0481 .0207 .0422 .0144 
 
Notes: These regressions only consider decisions and beliefs in rounds 1, 3, 5 and 8 of the fishing game 
where pond capacity =2 or 4. Estimates are from Probit regressions clustered at the individual level, 
with marginal effects reported as point estimates, and fully robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. * is 10% significance level; ** is 5%, and *** 1%. 
 
